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Essay
DRIFTING APART: HOW WEALTH AND RACE SEGREGATION
ARE RESHAPING THE AMERICAN DREAM
SHERYLL D. CASHIN*
I. INTRODUCTION
S OMETIME after mid-century, no one racial or ethnic group will be in
the majority in the United States. America therefore has two choices
in terms of how it will respond to complex diversity. It can forge a new,
exciting, multi-cultural identity. Or it can balkanize.
Unfortunately, much of my research indicates that we are taking the
latter road. In this Essay, I present a brief overview of the research and
arguments I intend to present in a book about race and class segregation
in America.
I must begin with an important caveat. Unfortunately, much of the
social science research on the census and demographic trends focuses on
four broad categories of people: whites, blacks, Latinos and Asians-with
much of the historical research emphasizing blacks and whites.1 I recog-
nize that the United States is infinitely more complex than this. The 2000
census was the first in U.S. history that allowed persons to designate them-
selves as more than one race. Our national rainbow is quickly adding
spectra.
Because of the ability to define oneself in multi-race terms, a possible
126 combinations of race and ethnicity were available on the 2000 census
form, up from just 6 in the past. Only 2.4% of census respondents, how-
ever, chose to define themselves as more than one race. That makes analy-
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Empowerment Zones, Department of Housing and Urban
Development (1995-1996); Director for Community Development, National
Economic Council, The White House (1993-1995).
This Essay embodies a keynote address given on January 25, 2002 on the
occasion of the Villanova University School of Law's Commemoration of the
Legacy of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Professor Cashin is currently writing a book
of the same title that will be published in 2003 by PublicAffairs.
1. See, e.g., Lewis Mumford Center for Comparative Urban and Regional Re-
search, Choosing Segregation: Racial Imbalance in American Public Schools, 1990-2000,
(Jan. 18, 2002) [hereinafter Choosing Segregation] (analyzing segregation among
public elementary schools nationwide), available at http://mumfordl.dyndns.org/
cen2000/SchoolPop/SPReport/SPReport.doc; Lewis Mumford Center for Com-
parative Urban and Regional Research, The New Ethnic Enclaves in America's Suburbs,
(July 9, 2001) (examining "trends in suburban racial-ethnic composition and seg-




sis easier. But my caveat remains. Unfortunately, race relations are always
more complicated than anyone who is trying to provide a synthesis can
convey. But I believe there are important truths we can glean from the
empirical research.
The story is complicated, but here is my essential argument: Segrega-
tion is the natural tendency in America. And segregation, both racial and
economic, breeds inequality. It also breeds an indifference to "other" that
inhibits us from meaningfully redressing inequality. So in a sense, we are
stuck. Stuck with crumbling, underperforming schools in urban centers
and a political context that prevents systemic change. Stuck with an in-
creasingly "winner-take-all" system in which people fortunate to live in af-
fluent environs fully live the American dream, protect their tax base and
wall themselves off from social distress.
By secluding the primary determiners of America's policy debates-
white, suburban middle-class voters-from people who are different from
themselves, we have created a political context in which it is very difficult
to pursue any policy agenda that could be perceived as benefiting groups
other than this dominant group. Worse, this political division occurs in an
economic system that increasingly rewards this same affluent, professional,
largely suburban class, creating gaps of opportunity that are unlikely ever
to be closed.
II. OVERVIEW OF CENSUS TRENDS
Currently, with each passing decade, we as a nation are becoming in-
creasingly segregated by income. And our progress in racially integrating
neighborhoods is proceeding at a glacial pace. Segregation persists at very
high levels for African-Americans. The national index for segregation of
blacks from whites is 65.2 This index value, known by demographers as
"dissimilarity"3 is the percentage of one group that would have to move to
achieve an even racial distribution. In other words, 65% of black people
would have to move in order for them to be represented throughout
America in proportions reflecting their percentage of the population. A
dissimilarity value of 60 or above is considered by demographers as very
high segregation. Values of 40 to 50 are considered moderate, while val-
ues of 30 or less are considered low. It is worth underscoring that 65 is the
national index of segregation for African-Americans. One-half of all black
2. See Lewis Mumford Center for Comparative Urban and Regional Research,
Sortable List of Dissimilarity Scores [hereinafter Sortable List of Dissimilarity Scores] (sum-
marizing "population counts and segregation scores for people of all ages in the
331 metropolitan areas in the 2000 Census"), available at http://mumnfordl.
dyndns.org/cen2000/WholePop/WPsort/sortdl .html.
3. See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Integration Game, 100
COLUM. L. REV. 1965, 1976 n.27 (2000) (explaining dissimilarity concept). "Essen-
tially, the [dissimilarity] index gauges what proportion of the black population in a
certain geographical area will have to move to accomplish equal racial distribution
in that area." Id.
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people live in large metropolitan areas where the segregation index is 75
or higher.
The national dissimilarity index for segregation from whites is 52 for
Latinos and 42 for Asians. 4 After an 8% decline in the 1970s, segregation
levels for blacks have been declining by about 4% per decade. At this rate
it would take another forty years to approach the level of moderately high
segregation of Latinos today. Meanwhile, segregation levels for Latinos
and Asians have remained essentially the same since 1980. Yet, because
these groups are growing rapidly, the neighborhoods they live in are be-
coming more racially isolated.
The Latino population grew by 58% in the 1990s. Latinos have sur-
passed blacks as the largest minority group. At about 35 million people
they are 12.5% of the population compared to African-Americans, who
comprise 12.3% of the U.S. population. 5 The Asian population grew by
48% in the 1990s. At about 10 million people, they comprise 3.6% of the
U.S. population. At the same time, the African-American population grew
by 16% and the white population grew by 6%.6
So you have a white population that is growing slowly while people of
color are surging in numbers. One might think that this would result in
significantly more mixing of the races at the neighborhood level. But the
consistent trend I see from the census data is one of entrenched segrega-
tion, and African-Americans bear its heaviest burdens. About 30% of
black people are relegated to hypersegregated, extremely impoverished
neighborhoods. According to Douglas Massey and Nancy Denton, no
other racial or ethnic group lives in neighborhoods this isolated from the
economic and social mainstream.7
Most of the improvement in racial integration is happening in high
growth areas in the south and west. American Apartheid is not breaking
down appreciably in the midwest and the northeast. In the large metro-
politan areas where the vast majority of people of color live, the pattern is
one of stasis or increased isolation. You have to go to areas that have only
very small numbers of people of color to find impressive rates of increased
integration.
The largest cities are much more segregated than the national segre-
gation levels I have described. About half of the one-hundred largest
metro areas became majority-minority in the 1990s, in no small part be-
cause of the widespread suburbanization of the white middle class. Many
4. See Sortable List of Dissimilarity Scores, supra note 2 (setting forth dissimilarity
scores for Latinos and Asians nationwide).
5. See Lewis Mumford Center for Comparative Urban and Regional Research,
2000 Census Data (providing racial and ethnic changes among national population
over 1980, 1990 and 2000 census), available at http://mumfordl.dyndns.org/cen
2000/WholePop/WPdownload.html.
6. See id.
7. See DOuGLAS S. MASSEY & NANcy A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGRE-
CATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 77 (1993).
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of these cities would have experienced a net decline in population were it
not for a healthy influx of immigrants.
A. Suburbanization
All racial groups are rapidly moving to the suburbs. But there are
tremendous differences. White America is largely a suburban nation: 71%
of whites call a suburb home. Black America is still mainly an urban na-
tion. Although the black middle class is suburbanizing rapidly, only 39%
of blacks live in suburbia. Latinos are roughly evenly dispersed between
cities and suburbs, while roughly 60% of Asians live in suburbs.
But moving to the suburbs is no guarantee of integration. On the
contrary, the same pattern of segregation is being replicated in suburbs.
Wherever people of color exist in large numbers in suburban communi-
ties, they tend to be segregated. Only those new suburban communities
with a very small fraction of people of color experienced dramatic in-
creases in integration in the 1990s.
B. Children
Children are more segregated than the population as a whole. As I
noted, the national black-white segregation index is 65.8 The national seg-
regation index for black and white children is 68.9 Black and Latino
youth are now more segregated into high-poverty schools than at any time
in the last thirty years. White students have also become more isolated,
but in their case segregation means richer suburban schools that attract
better teachers and superior resources. This trend is being fueled by the
movement of white families with children to largely white suburban en-
claves. The overlay of race and class for our children can be seen in the
following national statistics for elementary school children in the 1999-
2000 school year. These figures are based on the numbers of students who
receive free or reduced lunch. Nationally, white elementary school stu-
dents are in schools that are 30% poor.10 Asian children are in schools
that are 43% poor.1 Black children are in schools that are 65% poor.12
Latino children are in schools that are 66% poor.13
So racial segregation benefits white students by placing them in
schools with very different environments and much less class disadvantage.
Black and Latino children are the ones who are paying the real price of
racial segregation. It is a fact that bedevils efforts to bring parity to the
educational opportunities available to children of all races. I also think it
does not augur well for race relations or our national economy. The grow-
8. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
9. See Sortable List of Dissimilarity Scores, supra note 2.
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ing separation of minority and white children into highly different educa-
tional realms and social milieu suggests that this strain of difference will
continue to haunt us in future generations.
C. Economic Segregation
Unfortunately, the government has not yet released the economic
data from the 2000 census. But the schools data I just provided demon-
trates the present effects of class separation. Previous censuses show that
with each passing decade, both the affluent and the poor are becoming
more segregated from the rest of society. Beyond the separation of the
affluent and the poor, economic segregation has been increasing across
the board. Most new residential developments in the United States are
highly homogeneous by income. These twin forces-persistent racial seg-
regation and rising economic segregation-are creating the new, winner-
take-all system.
Segregation-both economic and racial-is structuring inequality
into our system. Racially segregated neighborhoods, unless they are white
ones, typically offer poorer schools, higher crime, higher taxes, and fewer
jobs than the aspirational ideal most Americans (of all races) have in mind
for themselves. In contemporary black suburbs, for example, there is a big
difference in the residential returns for the black middle class, as com-
pared to those enjoyed by their white suburban counterparts.1 4
D. Factors Contributing to Segregation
There are at least two factors contributing to the persistence of racial
segregation in housing. One is garden variety, rank discrimination. A
black person who attempts to buy or rent a home has a 50% chance of
being discriminated against; if the black mover deals with at least three
agents she has a 90% chance of being discriminated against. Latinos at-
tempting to access housing can expect to be discriminated against 43-35%
of the time.1 5
The second is the personal preferences of the American people. Ac-
cording to social survey data, the majority of all races say they do not mind
integration, so long as their own racial group is in the majority. No racial
group wants to be vastly outnumbered by other races. And there is a con-
sistent strain of antipathy on the part of whites, Latinos, and Asians toward
integrating with blacks. These groups are highly uncomfortable with ma-
14. For an analysis of the state of residential integration and the impact of
racial segregation on the black middle class, see Sheryll D. Cashin, Middle-Class
Black Suburbs and the State of Integration: A Post-Integrationist Vision for Metropolitan
America, 86 CORNELL L. REv. 729 (2001).
15. SeeJohn Yinger, Housing Discrimination Study: Incidence and Severity of
Unfavorable Treatment (prepared for the U.S. Dept. of Housing and Urban Devel-
opment, Washington, D.C. (1991)); see alsoJOHN YINGER, CLOSED DOORS, OPPORTU-
NITIES LOST: THE CONTINUING COSTS OF HOUSING DISCRIMINATION (1995).
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jority-black neighborhoods. African-Americans are the group with which
they least prefer integrating.
At the same time African-American enthusiasm for integration ap-
pears to be waning. When confronted with the option of integrating with
whites, blacks now most favor a heavily black neighborhood-one that is
three-quarters black. In the idealistic 1970s, blacks, most preferred a
neighborhood that was one-half black and one-half white. Latinos and
Asians, by contrast, currently prefer fifty-fifty integration with whites to a
neighborhood in which their group overwhelming dominates. The consis-
tent trend in suburbanization of minorities, then, has been one of enclave
formation. Even those who want to live in an integrated neighborhood
have a harder time than they might imagine finding one. Often the
choice for a minority suburban mover is between an overwhelmingly white
area or a minority enclave.
So if we think about where America is headed in the 21st century, if
current trends are any guide it is decidedly not in the direction of mixed-
income neighborhoods. And for most Americans, it is not in the direction
of mixed-race neighborhoods. The issue to which I will devote the re-
mainder of this Essay is the degree to which geographic separation of
races and classes influences public policy choices.
III. PUBLIC POLICY CHOICES
In my forthcoming book I argue that physical separation begets a
politics of parochial self-interest. Once homogeneity is achieved, any pol-
icy proposal that threatens to undermine that homogeneity-like afforda-
ble housing-is likely to meet with virulent resistance.
Citizens in their individual localities are rationally motivated to maxi-
mize benefits for their own community and to limit fiscal burdens by deny-
ing access to populations and land uses that they perceive as undesirable.
This often happens in new suburbs, which are home to most new gated
and private communities, contributing to a phenomenon that former La-
bor Secretary Robert Reich coined "the secession of the successful. '1 6
A metropolitan divide has begun with a phenomenon that I have re-
ferred to in my writing as "the tyranny of the favored quarter."1 7 In most
metropolitan areas there is a quadrant where only about 25% of the re-
gional population lives, but this quadrant garners the majority of public
infrastructure investments that fuel growth. In addition, it garners the vast
majority of the job growth in the region. But, through the retention of
local municipal powers, this favored quarter is able to wall itself off from
all of the region's social service burdens. It typically has no affordable
housing, few apartment complexes and very few poor children in its
16. Robert B. Reich, Secession of the Successful, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 1991, § 6
(Magazine), at 16.
17. Sheryll D. Cashin, Localism, Self-Interest, and the Tyranny of the Favored Quar-
ter: Addressing the Barriers to New Regionalism, 88 GEO. L.J. 1985, 2003 (2000).
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schools. Sometimes these quadrants refuse or resist participating in met-
ropolitan public transportation.
The disaggregation of the wealth and tax base from disadvantaged
populations and from more general government service burdens raises
certain philosophical and moral questions. The social contract in metro-
politan regions is being eroded.
We have a segmentation of society where one group gets the best of
everything and everyone else-the two-thirds of the regional population
that lives in the central city and first ring of older suburbs-is frequently
saddled with shrinking tax bases, increasing service demands, un-
derperforming schools, and the like.
Suburbanization, and the attendant proliferation of new, homoge-
nous localities, has also had consequences for state and national politics.
In state politics, an increase in redistributive spending is tantamount to
political suicide for a governor.
Former governor Jim Florio of New Jersey experienced this first hand
in 1990 when he proposed a tax increase on those earning over $100,000
in order to pay for increased state aid to woefully underfunded poor
school districts. His popularity ratings promptly crashed by 19% and he
lost his re-election bid to an opponent, Christine Todd Whitman, who
promised a 30% cut in income tax rates.
Florio was punished for boldly saying to affluent people that their
state could not succeed fiscally and socially without them paying a fairer
share of taxes. But this goes deeply against the grain of voter expectations.
Indeed, the outcome of most fiscal debates in state legislatures tends to be
determined by the desires of middle class suburban voters.
This dominance is most pronounced in the context of school finance
reform. For three decades civil rights lawyers have been fighting a battle
in state courts to equalize funding between rich and poor school districts.
That some school districts enjoy a magnificent and growing tax base and
others do not leads to funding inequalities, which most state governments
now redress to a degree with state equalization grants.
To date, about twenty state supreme courts have declared their state's
system of school finance unconstitutional under state constitution educa-
tion clauses and have ordered remedies.18 A number of state legislatures
18. See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices, 624 So. 2d 107, 111 (Ala. 1993);
Roosevelt Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 66 v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806, 815-16 (Ariz.
1994); DuPree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30, 651 S.W.2d 90, 93 (Ark. 1983); Serrano v.
Priest, 557 P.2d 929, 952 (Cal. 1976); Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359, 374 (Conn.
1977); Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 213 (Ky. 1989);
McDuffy v. Sec'y of Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 552 (Mass. 1993);
Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 769 P.2d 684, 690 (Mont. 1989); Clare-
mont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 703 A.2d 1353, 1357 (N.H. 1997); Robinson v. Cahill,
303 A.2d 273, 295 (N.J. 1973); DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E.2d 733, 740 (Ohio 1997);
Tenn. Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139, 155 (Tenn. 1993); Edgewood
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 804 S.W.2d 491, 498 (Tex. 1991); Brigham v. State, 692
A.2d 384, 395 (Vt. 1997); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 104 (Wash.
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have also taken on school finance reform, even in the absence of a court
mandate. One study comparing the outcomes of court-ordered and vol-
untary legislative reforms offered a unique opportunity to test the limits of
political will on equity funding for schools. The study concluded that only
when a state court ordered a specific remedy did state legislatures effec-
tively close the gap in funding between poor and affltent school districts.
In the absence of a court order, school finance reforms enacted by state
legislatures did not equalize funding between such districts and sometimes
they actually left poor school districts worse off Instead, middle class suburban
school districts typically benefited most under any voluntary school fi-
nance reform. In other words, state legislatures were incapable of devel-
oping an effective political solution to the problem of school inequality,
and suburban voters were the chief obstacle. 19
Thus, race and class segregation alters not just opportunity in
America; it alters politics. Embedded in our political culture is a bias-a
set of institutional rules of the game-which frequently benefits middle
class suburbanites at the expense of others.
In the 1992, 1996 and 2000 presidential elections, the nation wit-
nessed increasing political competition for the votes of the suburban mid-
dle class. One manifestation of this competition, in my view, was the
pursuit of punitive policies toward the most disenfranchised. In 1992,
then-candidate Bill Clinton established his bona fides with suburban vot-
ers, inter alia, by supporting the death penalty and promising to "end wel-
fare as we know it."20 In anticipation of his 1996 bid for re-election,
President Clinton signed a welfare reform law that many of his own policy
advisors believed was unnecessarily punitive toward the poor.21 In addi-
tion, during his eight years in office, President Clinton oversaw the addi-
tion of fifty new death penalties to the federal penal code and the largest
expansion of the prison population in American history. While Clinton
was touted by Toni Morrison as "the first black President,"22 a dispropor-
tionate number of these new prisoners were African-Americans.
Without question, the poor and racial minorities benefited from nu-
merous Clinton Administration policies. My point is that Clinton felt com-
pelled to pursue other, more punitive policies that clearly signaled to
suburban voters-namely whites-that he was a Democrat who could be
trusted to govern. President George W. Bush's pursuit of tax policies that
1978); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 884 (W. Va. 1979); Washakie County Sch.
Dist. No. I v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 335 (Wyo. 1980).
19. See William N. Evans et al., Schoolhouses, Courthouses, and Statehouses After
Serrano, 16J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 10 (1997).
20. In Their Own Words, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 1992, at A14 (transcript of speech
by Clinton accepting 1992 Democratic presidential nomination).
21. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996, 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-1778 (1996).
22. Toni Morrison, The Talk of the Town, NEW YORKER, Oct. 5, 1998, at 32.
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greatly favor affluent voters is less obviously tied to the suburbanization of
the electorate, although I believe this case can be made.
V. PROPOSALS
If at the dawn of the 21st century a color line still haunts America and
an economic line looms even larger, what should we, what can we do about
it? Answering that question is the chief struggle of my forthcoming book.
First, we should recommit ourselves to the fundamentally American
value of opportunity for all. We should prosecute anti-discrimination and
civil rights laws with renewed vigor. Eradicating discrimination, as much
as possible, from real estate markets will help accelerate the trend of mod-
est declines in racial segregation. As we achieve more racial integration,
we will reduce disparities of opportunity. The ideal would be perfect inte-
gration of the races and classes-a world where poor and working class
people of all races are equally dispersed among all communities. This is
close to the reality for poor whites. A poor white person is more likely to
live in a middle-class, suburban setting than in an area of concentrated
poverty.
But a degree of segregation, like racism, seems inevitable in America.
Racial integration is very difficult to sustain, in part because whites typi-
cally flee whenever blacks reach a critical mass in their neighborhood.
Thus, second, we must acknowledge that we are a segregated society
and attack the inequalities that flow from our fragmented condition. This
will be very difficult because race and class separation creates notjust phys-
ical distance but often vast social distance. But certain strategies and cer-
tain rhetoric could make a difference.
I believe that equal opportunity rhetoric offers a context for at-
tracting the broadest possible coalition to a progressive agenda. Most
Americans believe that everyone should have a fair chance to prosper and
understand that such broad opportunity is necessary to ensure our na-
tion's long-term prosperity. But appropriate political rhetoric, while nec-
essary, will not change the status quo. As Frederick Douglass, one of my
personal heroes, once said: "Power concedes nothing without a demand.
It never did and it never will."23
No fundamental change to our current system of differential opportu-
nity and entrenched advantage will occur without an unprecedented activ-
ism on the part of those who currently suffer its effects. Anyone who
thinks otherwise is kidding herself. Far too many people and interests,
wittingly or unwittingly, benefit from our fragmented condition.
It will take a great deal of civic education and engagement for a prin-
ciple of equal opportunity to take root in a fragmented America. Powerful
23. Frederick Douglass, Speech Before the West Indian Emancipation Society
(Aug. 4, 1857), in 2 PHILIP S. FONER, THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF FREDERICK Douc-
LAS 437, 437 (1950).
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new coalitions among interests that currently do not see themselves as al-
lies will have to be formed.
V. CONCLUSION
In the end, I argue that our nation should focus on improving basic
mobility and opportunity for all Americans, regardless of where they live.
I call for dramatic improvements in educational opportunity, including
universal child care, public pre-school, and opportunity or mobility grants
for those children relegated to high-poverty schools. If any such policies
are to become a reality, however, the great American majority must recog-
nize that this is in their enlightened self-interest. We must acknowledge
that children in some neighborhoods have mountains to ascend with no
appropriate guides, while children in others are essentially being led along
a well-paved path. We must also understand that, despite our segregated
state, the fragments are very inter-dependent. Our long-term economic
competitiveness will suffer in a climate where only some communities and
some students are able to develop to their full potential. Imagine an
America with a starker failure than we have now and you will appreciate
the risks for the future. An equal opportunity agenda will take root only
with a renewed activism around issues of basic fairness and our mutual
interdependence. Currently there is much that is unfair about America,
and far too few people are willing to own up to it.
604 [Vol. 47: p. 595
